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LINKING INTERNATIONAL MARKETS
AND GLOBAL JUSTICE
B UYING S OCIAL J USTICE: EQUALITY, GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT, AND
L EGAL C HANGE. By Christopher McCrudden. Oxford and New York:

Oxford University Press. 2007 . Pp. Ii, 680. Cloth, $225 ; paper, $95 .

Jeffrey L. Dunotf
I NTRODUCTION

The U .S. government is the planet's largest purchaser of goods and ser
1
vices; worldwide, states spend trillions of dollars on procurement each
2
year. Yet legal scholarship has devoted relatively limited attention to the
conceptual and normative issues that arise when states enter the market.
Should states as purchasers be permitted to "discriminate" to advance social
objectives-say, racial justice-in ways that would be unlawful when they
act as regulators? Is each country free to strike its own balance between the
pursuit of economic and social objectives through procurement, or do inter
national trade norms limit state discretion in the name of economic
efficiency? Should states be permitted to use procurement to advance social
objectives, like environmental protection or worker rights, in other states?
Government procurement is often viewed as a legal labyrinth of arcane
tendering procedures, murky supplier qualifications, and obscure challenge
mechanisms. In Buying Social Justice: Equality, Government Procurement,
3
and Legal Change ("BSJ"), Christopher McCrudden challenges this under
standing and details how procurement law and policy is profoundly linked
with the pursuit of social justice. By demonstrating that we can-and
should-understand procurement as being not simply about the purchase of
pens and paper clips but also as a potentially powerful vehicle for advancing
*
Nomura Visiting Professor of International Financial Systems, Harvard Law School;
Professor of Law and Di"rector, Institute for International Law and Public Policy, Temple University
Beasley School of Law. I am grateful to Sungjoon Cho, Theresa Glennon, Craig Green, Duncan
Hollis, Andrew Lang, Petros Mavroidis, Mark Rahdert, Robert Reinstein, and Joel Trachtman for
comments on earlier drafts or for exchanges regarding the arguments presented in this Review.
Research on this project began when I was a Visiting Senior Research Scholar at the Program in
Law and Public Affairs, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University. Support for this research
was provided by the Clifford Scott Green Chair and Research Fund in Law.

I . U.S. SMALL Bus. Am111 N., AN INTRODUCTION TO THE U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINI
STRATION (SBA) 8 (2007), available at http://www.sba.gov/idc/groups/public/documents/sba_
homepage/serv_abt_overview_english.doc.

2. 0RG. FOR EcON. COOPERATION & DEV., THE SIZE OF GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT
MARKETS 29 (2002) [hereinafter OECD], available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/34/ 1 4/
1 845927.pdf.
3. Professor of Human Rights Law, University of Oxford; Affiliated Overseas Faculty, the
University of Michigan Law School.
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diverse social goals, the book subverts conventional views of procurement
and identifies new areas of scholarly inquiry and public debate.
BSJ covers an enormously wide range of topics, including the history of
the use of procurement for social purposes (Chapters 2--4, 1 0-14); the theo
retical arguments for and against the use of procurement policy for social
ends (Chapter 5); the trajectory of procurement policy in numerous devel
oped and developing states (Chapters 6-1 0) ; the on-again, off-again nature
of international negotiations over procurement (Chapters 8, 1 1-14); pro
curement policy's influence on the corporate social responsibility movement
(Chapter 1 2) ; and the international legality of various domestic procurement
programs (Chapters 1 5- 1 7). As even this highly abbreviated list of topics
suggests, BSJ is an extraordinarily ambitious text that resists easy summary.
This Review examines both the details and the rhetorical structure of
McCrudden's arguments. Specifically, it analyzes some of the issues BSJ
discusses that are of special interest to international lawyers, including
particularly the legality of one country using its procurement policy to
advance social goals abroad (e.g., when several U.S. states passed laws
designed to address human rights in Burma). In this context, I elaborate on
McCrudden's analysis in several regards. Specifically, I examine the rules
that govern the state's ability to pursue social goals as a regulator and as a
market actor. Does the state have greater freedom when acting in one
capacity than in the other? Would differential treatment permit states to
pursue through the back door objectives that they are legally unable to
pursue through the front door?
In addition, this Review examines the structure of McCrudden's
argument. Much of BSJ relies on a problematic distinction between pursuit
of economic goals and pursuit of social goals through procurement.
Although the distinction is commonly found in the literature, BSJ itself
demonstrates that it obscures as much as it reveals. Moreover, as explained
more fully below, McCrudden's framing of the issues, mode of analysis, and
understanding of the relative centrality of formal legal norms shares much
with two literatures that BSJ straddles-scholarship analyzing government
procurement law, and writings on the relationship between international
trade and human rights. However, with its virtually exclusive focus on
formal legal rules and doctrinal analysis, BSJ is as interesting for what it
omits-namely, sustained discussion of the empirical effects of international
procurement policy-as for what it includes. Indeed, while BSJ is ostensibly
about legal history and legal analysis, the text can also be read as implicitly
demonstrating the limits of legal analysis and the shortcomings associated
with approaching social problems exclusively through a legal lens.
BSJ is a valuable addition to the literature on procurement. Although some
of its arguments are not fully persuasive, this impressive text invites us to re
think the relationships between procurement and social justice. To highlight
some of BSI's most important contributions, this Review proceeds as follows.
Part I briefly summarizes the economic importance of government procure
ment, the history of government efforts to use procurement to serve social
goals, and the move toward international rules in this area. Part II reviews the
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international norms governing procurement, as well as McCrudden's analysis

of the legality of one state using procurement policy to address human rights
conditions in other states. It also addresses an issue that

BSJ

largely elides:

given that a state can use various policy instruments to advance the same so
cial objective, should the law permit states to pursue certain ends through
procurement but prohibit them from pursuing the same ends through regula
tion? In this context, I identify some anomalies in current law. Part III
locates McCrudden's book within the larger debates over trade and human
rights. It shows that

BSJ

uses modes of argumentation and conceptual

frameworks common to this larger literature, and identifies some of the limi
tations

associated

with these frameworks.

Ironically,

however,

these

limitations point the way toward a j ustification for giving states wide lati
tude in using procurement to pursue social objectives.
I. A B RIEF I NTRODUCTION TO GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT
Public procurement-"the purchasing by government from private sec

tor contractors, usually on the basis of competitive bidding, of goods and
services that government needs" (p. 3)-is the primary mechanism by which
4
public monies are spent. The economic impact of procurement is enormous.

The U . S . government now spends over $400 billion on procurement each
year, 5 and spending by U.S. states, municipalities, and other subnational
governmental units, in the aggregate, significantly exceeds federal spend
ing.6 In 1 998, total procurement (both consumption and investment) for all
levels of government in industrialized states was estimated to be $4.73 tril
lion, an amount equivalent to 82.3% of total world merchandise and
7

commercial services exports.

Given their economic clout, it is not surprising that governments have

often used their purchasing power as a tool to advance public policy
objectives.

BSJ

describes efforts by the United States and European

countries in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to use procurement as a
tool of national industrial policy, including addressing regional disparities
(pp. 25-3 1 ) ; ensuring fair working conditions, such as minimum wage and
maximum hours (pp. 37-48); and employing both disabled ex-servicemen
and disabled workers (pp. 56-62).
These early efforts had transnational dimensions that prefigure many
contemporary

concerns,

particularly

regarding

the

ability

to

impose

4. For current purposes procurement should be distinguished from state trading, which is
the commercial activity of state-owned enterprises.
5. MAJORITY STAFF OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND Gov'T REFORM, l IOTH CONG.,
MORE DOLLARS, LESS SENSE: WORSENING CONTRACTING TRENDS UNDER THE BusH ADMINISTRA
TION, at i (Comm. Print 2007), available at http://oversight.house.gov/features/moredollars/
moredollars.pdf.
6. Procurement by sub-federal bodies was estimated to be $6 1 6 billion in fiscal year 2007
and $585 billion in fiscal year 2006. Trade Policy Review Body, Report by the Secretariat: Trade
Policy Review: United States, 68, WT/TPR/S/200 (May 5, 2008).
7.

OECD, supra note 2, at 7-8.
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requirements on foreign companies and the economic impact of such
requirements on domestic firms. For example, in a 1 909 legislative debate in
the United Kingdom over a resolution requiring government contractors to
pay prevailing wages, a member of Parliament argued that "unless it were
found possible to impose similar conditions upon foreign competitors, any
extension of the Fair Wages Clause must inevitably cause hardship amongst
English contractors and unemployment amongst English working men"
(p. 5 1 ). This comment foreshadows contemporary concerns that strong
domestic regulation can disadvantage national firms that compete in
international markets.
The early developments reveal another international dynamic that con
tinues: states' propensities to use procurement policy to favor local
producers by excluding foreign competition. Since 1 844, the United States
has had legislation requiring some federal agencies to purchase domestic
goods (p. 26), a policy currently codified in the Buy American Act
8
("BAA"). This complex federal statute requires, in effect, "that materials,
supplies, articles, or (since 1 990) services that are acquired for public use
should be substantially American" (p. 26; footnote omitted).
McCrudden properly emphasizes the international concerns driving this
legislation. First, the specific motivation for the 1 933 BAA was the concern
that a German firm would win a contract for the power plant at the Hoover
Dam (p. 27). The BAA was also motivated by a general desire to "re
taliat[e ]" against discriminatory practices of other states (p. 27). For
example, since 1920 the British had required that materials used for
Treasury-financed construction "be of British origin and all manufactured
articles of British manufacture" (p. 27). Several U.S. legislators wished to
respond in kind. Senator Bingham, of Connecticut, summarized the argu
ment: "There is only one way to meet a perfectly reasonable national
movement of that kind and that is the so-called 'buy American' movement"
(p. 27).
The prominence of international concerns in early procurement debates,
including concerns over international competitiveness and evidence of "tit
for tat" exclusionary policies, did not, however, produce international agree
ment in this area. Indeed, prior to World War II there were virtually no
multilateral instruments addressing procurement. During the later stages of
the War, the United States engaged the Allies in discussions over the shape
of the post-War international economic order.9 In particular, the United
States circulated a draft agreement providing that government procurement
be subject to the same nondiscrimination principles that would govern other
10
trade measures. However, the United Kingdom and other states objected to

8.
9.
(2008).

41 U.S.C. §§ I Oa-d (2000).
For an authoritative account, see DOUGLAS A. IRWIN ET AL, THE GENESIS OF THE GATI

10.
U.S. Dept. of State, Suggested Chaner for an International Trade Organization of the
United Nations, U.S. Dept. of State Pub. 2598, Commercial Policy Series 93 ( 1 946).
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11
these provisions, and they were eventually dropped. In their place, a clause
specifically excluding government procurement from the general nondis
crimination norms was added. The resulting text became the basis for the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GAIT"). Thus, the GAIT
which would become the central multilateral instrument governing interna
tional trade from 1947 through 1 994--explicitly excluded government
procurement from its nondiscrimination provisions.
However, by the 1 960s, thinking about procurement started to change,
and a movement toward multilateral rules began. In 1 96 1 , the European
Community began a long process of limiting discrimination in government
procurement by adopting two "General Programmes"-in essence, action
plans-seeking gradually to reduce restrictions on access to government
contracts (p. 105). Shortly thereafter, a procurement dispute between
Belgium and the United States arising out of a change to the BAA sparked
negotiations at the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development
("OECD") (pp. 1 86-209). The OECD created a working group to explore
ways of limiting discrimination against foreign suppliers, and by 1 967 the
working group had produced a draft code of conduct.
These developments paved the way for negotiations at the GAIT that, in
1979, resulted in an international agreement on rules to liberalize and im
12
prove the transparency of procurement. In some ways, this treaty was a
remarkable accomplishment, as it reversed more than fifty years of trade
policy and law. Specifically, it provided that each party was prohibited from
discriminating against other parties in the area of procurement. However,
coverage was limited in a number of important respects. First, the agreement
covered only central governments, not subnational governments, and only
goods, not services. Second, purchases had to be above a certain threshold
to be covered by the agreement. Third, the agreement did not extend to all
GATT parties; the treaty's membership consisted almost exclusively of
OECD states. Finally, the agreement covered only purchases by government
bodies listed by parties in an Annex to the treaty. The listing of agencies in
the Annex "was the subject of multilateral negotiations in which states at
tempted to arrive at a rough balance of procurement value commitments
offered by each state party" (p. 1 0 1). For example, when the European
Community did not offer to cover certain entities, the United States with
drew coverage of, inter alia, the Transportation and Energy Departments, the
13
Army Corps of Engineers, and the Tennessee Valley Authority. Thus, al
though the agreement represented a significant diplomatic development, its
practical effect was limited.

1 1 . P. 98. For the standard h istory of these negotiations, see Annet Blank & Gabrielle
Marceau, The History of the Government Procurement Negotiations Since 1945, 5 Pus. PROCURE
MENT L. REV. 77, 82-83 ( 1996).
1 2.

Agreement on Government Procurement, MTN/NTM/W/2 1 1/Rev.2, Apr.

available at http://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/9 1 990048.pdf.

13.

See H.R. REP.

No. 96-3 17, at 96 ( 1 979).

12, 1979,
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Over time major trading nations, including the United States, sought to
extend the scope and coverage of this agreement, and, in 1 993, trading states
14
entered into a new Government Procurement Agreement ("GPA"). This
treaty entered into force on January 1 , 1 996, and substantially extended cov
15
erage in several respects. Perhaps most significantly, the GPA covers
services as well as goods, and it covers subnational as well as central gov
ernmental authorities. Due to these and other changes, the agreement is
estimated to cover ten times the value of purchases subject to the earlier
16
procurement treaty. In addition, the GPA contains complex rules regarding
the transparency of domestic procurement systems, including detailed provi
sions designed to publicize contract opportunities and award procedures,
limit discretion in competitive procedures, and enable interested parties to
17
challenge procurement procedures and decisions.
On the other hand, the GPA is far from comprehensive. Membership is
very limited: only forty WTO members-the overwhelming majority of
18
which are developed states-are party to the agreement. Moreover, cover
age is still limited to governmental units listed in Annexes to the GPA, i.e.,
19
parties can exempt certain agencies from GPA coverage. In addition, the
treaty only applies when procurement exceeds a certain threshold, which
varies depending upon the type of procurement and the level of government
2°
making the purchase. Finally, states can include "General Notes" in their
schedules, which provide for additional exceptions (p. 1 02). Notably, several
states have taken exceptions for procurement programs designed to advance
social goals. For example, the United States excluded "purchases under
small or minority-owned business preference programs" and certain "state
programs promoting the development of distressed areas and businesses
21
owned by minorities, disabled veterans, and women" from GPA coverage.

1 4. Agreement o n Government Procurement, Apr. 15, 1 994, Marrakesh Agreement Estab
lishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 4(b), Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay
Round, 33 1.L.M. 1 1 25 ( 1 994) [hereinafter GPA], available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/
legal_e/gpr-94_e.pdf.
1 5 . For extended analysis of the agreement, see SUE ARROWSMITH, GOVERNMENT PRO
CUREMENT IN THE WTO (2003), and Bernard M. Hoekman & Petros C. Mavroidis, Basic Elements
of the Agreement on Government Procurement, in LAW AND POLICY IN PUBLIC PURCHASING: THE
WTO AGREEMENT ON GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT 1 3 (Bernard M. Hoekman & Petros c. Mav
roidis eds., 1 997). At the same time, treaties entered into force creating the World Trade
Organization ("WTO"). In the discussion that follows, I shall use the terms GATT and WTO inter
changeably.
1 6. World Trade Org., General Overview of WTO Work on Government Procurement, http://
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/overview_e.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2008).
1 7.

See GPA, supra note 1 4, arts. IX, XIII, XVIl, XX.

1 8. GPA parties include Canada; the European Communities, including its twenty-seven
member states; Hong Kong, China; Iceland; Israel; Japan; Korea; Liechtenstein; the Kingdom of the
Netherlands with respect to Aruba; Norway; Singapore; Switzerland; and the United States. World
Trade Org., supra note 1 6.
1 9.

See GPA, supra note 1 4, art. I( l ) & app. I.

20.

See id. art. I(4) & app. I.

21.

H.R. Doc. No. 1 03-3 1 6, vol. 1 , at 1 040 ( 1994).
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The complexity of the international rules governing procurement is
compounded by the fact that numerous other international legal instruments
address procurement-and not always in a consistent manner. Many recent
bilateral and regional trade agreements contain chapters on government pro
curement, including, for example, the North American Free Trade
Agreement and every other trade agreement the United States has negotiated
since 1 994 (p. 223). In addition, various international bodies address pro
curement outside the context of trade agreements, including the World
23
22
Bank, the UN Environment Programme, the Inter-American Agency for
24
Cooperation and Development, and the UN Commission on International
25
Trade Law. In addition, the Council of Europe, UN General Assembly, and
numerous other international bodies work on the closely related fields of
.
26
bn.bery and corrupt10n.
On the one hand, this extensive activity represents a sea change from the
postwar era, when it proved impossible to develop international rules to dis
cipline government discretion in this area, including the discretion to
discriminate against foreigners. On the other hand, as we shall see below,
the resulting norms are often vague and difficult to discern, and the practical
effect of this activity is difficult to measure. One of BSJ's central inquiries is
whether existing rules strike an appropriate balance between procurement's
diverse goals. Hence, we tum to a more detailed analysis of the international
norms in this area.
II. T H E REGULATION OF GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT
We can read BSJ as an extended defense of using procurement as a tool
for advancing social values. To understand and evaluate BSJ's argument, it
is useful to distinguish (i) among different types of procurement laws, and
(ii) between the authority states have when they act as regulators and when
they act as buyers. As we shall see, states often have more discretion to pur
sue social objectives as market participants than they do as regulators.
However, BSJ's failure to offer a persuasive normative rationale for why
states should have greater discretion as purchasers renders the text more

22. WORLD BANK, GUIDELINES: PROCUREMENT UNDER IBRD LOANS A ND IDA CREDITS
(rev. 2006), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROCUREMENT/Resources/
ProcGuid- 1 0-06-ev I .doc.

23. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, PLANNING FOR CHANGE:
GUIDELINES FOR NATIONAL PROGRAMMES ON SUSTAINABLE CONSUMPTION AND PRODUCTION 29
(2008) (encouraging "sustainable procurement").
24. See, e.g. , Organization of American States, Annual Report of the Secretry General 20022003 OENSer.D/111.53 (English) (2003), available at http://www.oas.org/SGinfAnual/2003/

English/Annual_Report.pdf.
25. See, e.g., U.N. Comm'n on Int'I Trade Law UNCITRAL Model Law on Procuremelll of
Goods, Construction and Services with Guide to Enactment (June 1 5, 1 994), available at
,

http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/procurem/ml-procurement/ml-procure.pdf.
26. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott, Rule-Making in the WTO: Lessons from the Case of Brib
ery and Corruption, 4 J. INT'L EcoN. L. 275 (200 1 ).
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effective as a descriptive account of state practice than as a prescriptive
guide for lawmakers or reformers.
A. Different Strategies in Pursuit of Social Justice
Much of BSJ turns on the distinction between the state as regulator and
the state as market participant. In light of this distinction, we can usefully
distinguish three types of measures: one type explicitly discriminates against
outsiders (Type I law); a second type "discriminates" to achieve social goals
within the polity, such as racial equity or environmental protection (Type II
law); a third type seeks to advance social goals within another jurisdiction
(Type III law).
International trade law disfavors measures that facially discriminate
against foreign goods. GATT Article III provides that imported goods re
ceive treatment "no less favourable" than "like products of national
27
origin"-the so-called national treatment obligation. Laws that facially
discriminate against foreign products are likely to violate this or other WTO
nondiscrimination provisions.
As discussed above, the GAIT originally exempted government pro
curement from the national treatment obligation. Hence, procurement could
legally be-and often was-used to discriminate overtly against foreign
producers. However, over time states viewed this carve out for government
procurement as increasingly problematic, and the national treatment obliga
tion is at the heart of the GPA. Thus, under contemporary trade law, states
generally are not permitted to facially discriminate against foreign goods,
28
whether the state is acting as a regulator or as a purchaser.
International trade law treats Type II measures, such as those that pro
mote environmental protection, labor conditions, and other domestic social
objectives, quite differently. With respect to the state as regulator, the GATT
generally does not address a state's efforts to advance social objectives.
Rather, the GAIT is centrally concerned that states regulate in a nondis
criminatory manner; thus, the GATT prohibits states from discriminating
against "like products" (p. 473). A critical issue is whether products are
" 'like products' despite the fact that one was produced in a labour rights
friendly way and the other by means of the most egregious breaches of fun27. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. III, para. 4, Oct. 30, 1 947, 6 1 Stat. A-1 1 , 55
U.N.T.S. 1 94 [hereinafter GATT].
28. This is only true, of course, for those WTO members that are parties to the GPA. For
other WTO members, the operative norm remains that found in GATT Article Ill(8), which excludes
government procurement from the national treatment obligation.
It is interesting to compare these rules with dormant commerce clause analysis of state laws
that facially discriminate against commerce from sister states. Both WTO and U.S. law generally
prohibit discrimination against outsiders when the state acts as a regulator. However, the regimes
diverge significantly with respect to the state's ability to discriminate when it is a purchaser. U.S.
law permits states, as purchasers, to explicitly favor in-state interests over out-of-state interests, see
Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 ( 1 980), while the GPA strictly limits this power. We might ex
pect precisely the opposite result: since the commitments to a single market and unified polity are
dramatically stronger in the U.S. context, we might expect that the ability to discriminate against
outsiders would be greater in the international context.
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damental labour rights" (p. 473). This question is an instantiation of the
more general question of whether states can properly distinguish between
products because of the processes used to produce them. Dispute panels
29
have approached this question in different ways, and the GAIT-legality of
30
process-based trade restrictions is uncertain.
But even if a measure violates the national treatment obligation, it may
fall into one of the GATT's general exceptions. GATT Article XX permits,
under certain conditions, trade measures necessary to protect public morals;
necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; relating to the
products of prison labor; and relating to the conservation of exhaustible
natural resources (pp. 494-98). To date, no dispute panel has interpreted the
31
GATT's "public morals" exception, and scholars are divided over whether
it could be successfully invoked to justify measures against foreign products
32
produced under conditions that violate labor or human rights. Article XX
provisions on health and natural resources have been interpreted in several
cases involving environmental issues. For current purposes, it is sufficient to
note that dispute panels have shown increasing deference to trade-restrictive
33
measures that protect human safety and environmental resources. Thus,
when acting as regulators, states have substantial discretion to advance their
social agendas-though the precise amount of discretion they possess re
mains unclear.
Turning to the governing norms in the procurement context, the GPA in
cludes a national treatment provision (p. 474). Moreover, even if a measure

29. A highly controversial GA'IT panel used the product-process distinction to find that a
process-based U.S. environmental measure violated Article Ill . Panel Report, United States
Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS2 1/R - 39S/1 55 (Sept. 3, 1 99 1 ) (unadopted report); Jeffrey L.
Dunoff, Reconciling International Trade with Preservation of the Global Commons: Can We Pros
per and Protect?, 49 WASH . & LEE L. REV. 1 407 (1 992) (critiquing panel report). McCrudden notes
that in a more recent dispute, Appellate Body Report, European Communities - Measures Affecting
Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS l 35/AB/R (Mar. 12, 200 1), the Appellate Body
took "an important step away from the doctrine." P. 478.
30. Article Ill prohibits treatment that is less favorable; the mere fact that like domestic and
foreign products are treated differently is not sufficient to establish less favorable treatment. Appel
late Body Report, Korea-Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, para. 1 37,
WT/DS 1 6 1 /AB/R & WT/DS 1 69/AB/R (Dec. 1 1 , 2000). Rather a panel must examine "whether a
measure modifies the conditions of competition in the relevant market to the detriment of imported
products." Id. If different treatment does not affect the foreign product's competitive opportunities
then there is no violation of Article m.
3 1 . The General Agreement on Trade in Services includes an exception for "measures . . . to
protect public morals or to maintain public order." General Agreement on Trade in Services, art.
XIV, Dec. 15, 1 993, 33 I.L.M. 44 ( 1 994) [hereinafter GATS]. A panel found that "the term 'public
morals' denotes standards of right and wrong conduct maintained by or on behalf of a community or
nation." Panel Report, United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and
Betting Services, para. 6.465, WT/DS285/R (Nov. 10, 2004). The panel found that U.S. laws de
signed to counter underage and pathological gambling fell within the scope of the GATS exception.
32. See Steve Chamovitz, The Moral Exception in Trade Policy, 38 VA . J. INT'L L. 689
( 1 998); Nicolas F. Diebold, The Morals and Order Exceptions in WTO Law: Balancing the Tooth
less 1iger and the Undermining Mole, 1 1 J. INT'L EcoN. L. 43 (2008).
33. For excellent discussions, see Steve Chamovitz, The WTO 's Environmental Progress, 1 0
J. INT'L EcoN. L . 685 (2007), and Henrik Hom & Petros C. Mavroidis, Th e Permissible Reach of
National Environmental Policies, 42 J. WORLD ThADE 1 107 (2008).
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runs afoul of the GPA's national treatment clause, the GPA has an exceptions
provision that is similar to Article XX in many respects (pp. 49 1 -506).
However, there are at least two other ways that states may have greater
discretion to pursue social objectives when acting as market participants than
they do when acting as regulators. First, as noted above, the GPA permits
states to take detailed exceptions in "general notes" in their schedules
(p. 102). Several states, including the United States, Canada, Japan, and
Korea, have exempted from GPA coverage procurement laws aimed at
promoting small or minority-owned businesses (p. 2 1 8).
Second, McCrudden offers a strategy for states to use procurement to
pursue their social goals "lawfully, without having to resort to the excep
tions provisions" (p. 488). The suggestion, in effect, is to move away from
statute and regulation and "instead focus on using contract terms" (p. 489).
Thus, a state might add a contract condition requiring a contract-winning
firm to use only lumber that was sustainably harvested. McCrudden argues
that this approach would be consistent with the GPA, which he reads as
permitting the imposition of any contract term, so long as it is nondiscrimi
natory (p. 489). This contractual approach invites us to redefine what the
state is purchasing: a state might wish to purchase not lumber, but lumber
that is sustainably produced. More broadly, through procurement, the state
3
may seek to purchase the public good of social justice. 4
As discussed in Part III below, McCrudden's advocacy of a contractual
approach is a key analytic move that opens significant lines of inquiry.
However, this move-as McCrudden acknowledges-is highly "controver
sial" as a doctrinal matter (p. 489). It is not clear why a treaty would restrict
a state's ability to condition procurement on, say, human rights grounds
through tendering, bidding, and awards procedures, but permit an end-run
around these provisions through the careful drafting of contract terms.
Moreover, a norm that encourages states to pursue social goals through im
position of contract terms rather than through general procurement rules
would be in serious tension with one of the GPA's central objectives, which
is to increase transparency in procurement processes.
Thus far, we have focused on measures designed to promote interests
within the regulating state. Of greater interest to international lawyers are
domestic laws that seek to advance social objectives outside their borders,
which I have labeled Type III laws. Sometimes these laws target a particular
35
foreign jurisdiction (e.g., the Massachusetts-Burma law). Other times,
34. Pp. 538-52. For other approaches to using government contracts to promote public val
ues, see Laura A. Dickinson, Public Law Values in a Privatized World, 3 1 YALE J. INT'L L. 383
(2006), and Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 1 1 6 HARV. L. REV.
1 285 (2003 ).
35. In 1 996, Massachusetts passed legislation limiting state agencies from buying goods or
services from firms doing business in or with Burma. In 1998, Japan and the European Community
("EC") each filed a WTO complaint against the United States, alleging that the law violated the
GPA. Pp. 292-93. Contemporaneously, a trade association challenged the law in federal court.
Eventually, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a federal statute imposing sanctions on Burma pre
empted the state statute. Pp. 295-97. As a result, the EC and Japan dropped their complaints, and no
WTO body ever passed on the legality of the Massachusetts law.

April 2009]

Linking International Markets and Global Justice

1 049

measures are directed less at a jurisdiction than at a particular social prob
lem. For example, a Michigan executive order restricts expenditures of state
funds in ways that would contribute to the violation of internationally rec
36
ognized workers' rights. What legal norms should govern situations where
one state seeks to advance social objectives in other states? Specifically,
should international law treat these measures more like Type I measures that
discriminate against outsiders, or more like Type II regulations designed to
pursue social goals?
For the most part, the GATT analysis for regulations with extraterritorial
aims is similar to that set out above for Type II laws, particularly with re
spect to the GATT's nondiscrimination norms. It is unclear whether Article
XX could be used to justify a GATT-illegal measure designed to promote
interests outside the jurisdiction of the regulating state, and the Appellate
37
Body has carefully avoided resolution of this issue. The uncertainty sur
rounding whether Article XX is available heightens uncertainty as to
whether importing states can regulate to protect resources located outside
their territories.
However, although BSJ does not discuss it, another regulatory mecha
nism to promote social objectives abroad is available-at least to some
38
states. A GATT provision known as the Enabling Clause authorizes devel
oped states to extend preferential tariff treatment to goods from developing
states. Many of the largest trading nations-including the United States,
Canada, and the European Union-have used this authority to extend pref
39
erential tariffs to poorer nations. Some of these programs grant an
additional tariff preference to developing states that have taken specified
steps to address particular social issues. For example, current EU law pro
vides additional tariff benefits to developing states that have ratified and
implemented specific human rights treaties and at least seven of eleven
40
listed environmental and "good governance" treaties.
The Enabling Clause provides that preferences must be "generalized, non
41
reciprocal and non-discriminatory." The WTO Appellate Body has found
that the requirement to extend preferential treatment in a "non-discriminatory"
36. Mich. Exec. Dir. No. 2004-2 (Mar. 24, 2004), available at http://www.michigan.gov/
gov/0, 1 607 ,7- 168-36898_36900-88888--,00.html.
37. See, e.g. , Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp
and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 1 2, 1998).
38. Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of
Developing Countries, U4903 (Nov. 28, 1 979), GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 203 ( 1980) [herein
after Enabling Clause].
39. See, e.g., UN Conference on Trade and Development, Generalized System of Preferences
List of Beneficiaries, UNCTAD/ITCD/TSB/Misc.62/Rev.2 (2006) (listing beneficiaries for each of
the Generalized System of Preferences programs currently in operation). For a discussion of the
economics and the politics behind these programs, see Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Dysfunction, Diversion
and the Debate over Preferences: (How) Do Preferential Trade Policies Work?, in DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES IN THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM (Joel P. Trachtman & Chantal Thomas eds., forthcoming
2009).
40.

Council Regulation 980/2005, 2005 OJ. (L 1 69) I .

41.

Enabling Clause, supra note 38, at para. 2(a) fn.3.
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manner does not mandate identical treatment of all developing countries. Ra
ther, developed states can limit additional preferences only to those
developing countries that have common "development, financial and trade
42
needs." Thus, states seem to have substantial discretion to regulate in ways
designed to promote social conditions abroad.
The analysis is quite similar for procurement laws designed to promote
social objectives abroad. Again, states would seem to have broad discretion
to use procurement for this purpose, subject to GPA's nondiscrimination
norms. Notably, McCrudden claims that the Massachusetts-Burma law does
not violate the national treatment obligation. He argues that both foreign and
domestic suppliers "are treated equally favourably: both are subjected to a
difference in treatment regarding their engagement in Myanmar" (p. 482).
Moreover, McCrudden argues that the product-process distinction may not
be applicable to procurement measures (pp. 48 1-83), which would grant
states even broader discretion. In addition, states can presumably protect
Type III procurement laws, like other procurement laws, through exceptions
in their general notes (pp. 1 02, 2 1 8). Finally, McCrudden argues that the
goals of the Massachusetts-Burma law can be achieved through contract
terms. He specifically suggests adding a contract term prohibiting firms
from operating in Burma for the duration of the contract (p. 489). As noted
above, the GPA-consistency of this contractual approach is an open ques
43
tion.
B . The Problematic Distinction Between the State as

Regulator and the State as Market Participant
This highly abbreviated doctrinal analysis begs a normative analysis of
whether the rules that limit a state's discretion when it acts as regulator
should govern the state when it acts as purchaser, and whether the law
should permit procurement to be used to address social conditions in other
states. To answer these questions, we would need a theory of the state as
market participant. Scattered throughout BSJ are hints of what such a theory
would look like.
The leading arguments for why the state as purchaser should enjoy wide
discretion to discriminate to advance social objectives draw a sharp distinc
tion between the state's role when it acts as regulator and as a market
44
participant. This approach views regulation-the compelling or forbidding
of private action through the exercise of raw governmental power-as the
42. Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Conditions for the Granting of Tariff
Preferences to Developing Countries, WT/DS246/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2004). For an analysis and critique
of the Appellate Body's reasoning in this dispute, see Jeffrey L. Dunoff, When-and Why-Do Hard
Cases Make Bad Law? The GSP Dispute, in WTO LAW AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 283 (George
A. Bermann & Petros C. Mavroidis eds., 2007).
43.

See supra text accompanying note 34.

44. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court expressly invokes this distinction in justifying the
market participant exception to the dormant Commerce Clause. See, e.g., Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447
U.S. 429 ( 1 980); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 ( 1 976).
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quintessential state action. The state's uniquely coercive powers, including
powers to imprison, fine, and seize property, justify strong and comprehen
sive legal constraints on government action.
In contrast, when the state buys or sells, it exercises no essentially gov
ernmental powers. Instead, when it enters the marketplace, it is, in effect,
another private actor. Because the state acts in a very different capacity
when it buys, it should not be subject to the constraints that apply when it
regulates. Under this approach, the state should enjoy the same wide free
5
doms that private citizens do in choosing from whom to buy.4
However, there are difficulties with this argument. Many suggest that it
rests on a distinction between the state as regulator and the state as market
actor that is largely illusory. As Hersch Lauterpacht observed in a different
context, even when the state is "ostensibly removed from the normal field of
its political and administrative activities, the state nevertheless acts as a pub
lic person for the general purposes of the community as a whole . . . . [T]he
46
state always acts as a public person. It cannot act otherwise."
A variation on this critique would suggest that individuals, whether on
their own or acting collectively through states, often wish to encourage or
discourage various behaviors through their purchasing decisions. In these
circumstances, market activity has a self-consciously political dimension.
That is, as a buyer seeking to advance social objectives, the state embodies
two components that cannot be fully disaggregated. McCrudden appears to
be sympathetic to this argument: "When the government makes purchases, it
acts in the name of its citizens and ought to uphold certain standards"
(p. 378).
It is not entirely clear, however, how these critiques-which problema
tize the distinction between the state as regulator and the state as buyer--cut
as a doctrinal or a normative matter. If the state acts on behalf of its citizens,
expresses public values, and seeks to encourage or discourage behavior
when acting as both regulator and purchaser, then it seems appropriate to
subject both activities to the same (or similar) legal constraints. Paradoxi
cally, however, many who insist that the state as buyer is not simply another
private actor and who view procurement as a way to extend the state's reach
beyond that permitted through regulation also insist that the state should be
free to "discriminate" as buyer in various ways that it cannot as regulator.
Framed in these terms, this debate overlooks other possibilities. For ex
ample, perhaps the dichotomous debate over whether the state as regulator is
"like" or "not like" the state as buyer misleads insofar as it masks a contin
uum. At one end of the continuum are situations where the government is a
relatively minor player in a large market with many buyers and sellers
such as when the state buys pencils and paper clips. In these cases, with re
spect to the relevant market, the government is akin to a private party, and it

45. This is a primary justification for the so-called market participant exception to the dor
mant Commerce Clause that states enjoy in the procurement context.
46. H. Lauterpacht, The Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States, 28 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 220, 224 ( 1 95 1 ).
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may be appropriate for the government to enjoy greater discretion than it
47
does as regulator. At the other end of the continuum are situations where
the state is a monopsonist buyer, such as when it buys highly specialized
military equipment. In these circumstances, governmentally imposed condi
tions on procurement seem functionally analogous to regulation; it follows
that the constraints on government discretion should be functionally analo
gous to the constraints the state faces as a regulator.
Another possibility-which finds ample support in the domestic con
text-is that grounding doctrine in the conventional distinction between the
state as regulator and the state as market participant will not generate satis
48
factory or coherent results because it prompts us to ask the wrong
49
questions, thus diverting our attention from more salient inquiries. Indeed,
as described more fully in Part III below, while some of BSJ's arguments
rely upon a problematic distinction between regulation and procurement,
one of the text's important virtues is that it helps to highlight limitations of
the conventional debates, and thus begins to point us toward a more sophis
ticated theoretical account of government procurement.
III. PROCUREMENT AND SOCIAL JUSTICE
BSJ stands at the intersection of two debates central to recent WTO law
and politics: (i) the "linkage" debate, which examines the tensions between
market liberalization and restrictions on market activity to advance social
objectives; and (ii) the "procurement" debate, which explores the discretion
states have in setting their procurement policies, particularly to discriminate
against outsiders. BSJ is an admirable effort to connect these dialogues; as
McCrudden explains, "[t]he purpose of this book [is] to provide a bridge
between these [two debates] , a framework in which such a discussion can
take place in the specific context of procurement linkages" (p. 576). Given
BSJ's effort to provide a framework linking these debates, it is appropriate
to examine the analytic and argumentative framework that McCrudden em
ploys.
As explained in more detail below, two aspects of BSJ's framework are
problematic. First, while parts of BSJ set forth a sophisticated argument that
subverts the distinction between pursuit of economic and noneconomic
goals through procurement, much of the book relies on, and hence rein47. This is not an argument that the state should be entirely free of restraint. Just because a
private party in the marketplace can, for example, invidiously discriminate on the basis of race does
not mean the state should "enjoy" the same power.
48.
Many of the leading efforts to bring coherence to the doctrinal disarray in this area have
appeared in this journal. See, e.g., Dan T. Coenen, Untangling the Market-Panicipant Exemption to
the Dormant Commerce Clause, 88 MICH. L. REv. 395 ( 1 989); Donald H. Regan, The Supreme
Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV.
1 09 1 ( 1986).
49. Focusing on the traditional distinction effectively asks us to evaluate the relative impor
tance of a state's proprietary powers as opposed to its regulatory powers. But there seems to be little
basis for creating a hierarchy of state functions and powers in this way, and BSJ does not attempt to
do so.
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scribes and reinforces, this distinction. Second, BSJ rests on questionable
assumptions about the empirical effect procurement law has on official and
private behavior. As noted in Part II above, the GPA grants states very wide
latitude to pursue a broad range of social-justice objectives. BSJ provides
little evidence that international procurement norms have dissuaded states
from pursuing social policies, and substantial anecdotal evidence suggests
that in several respects the GPA's impact has been marginal . Nevertheless, as
elaborated below, the difficulties in BSJ's arguments point toward an impor
tant justification for affording states wide latitude in pursuing social goals
through procurement policy.
A. The Value of Balancing Trade and Social Values
BSJ offers a thoughtful analysis of the various dimensions of procure
ment law. However, this analysis is rendered less persuasive than it might
otherwise be by deep tensions in the book's treatment of the distinction be
tween using procurement for economic and for social purposes. Like most
of the writers in the two debates he straddles, McCrudden locates his analy
sis within a framework defined by the potential conflicts between pursuit of
trade or economic objectives, on the one hand, and social objectives, such as
labor or human rights, on the other. And, as with much linkage scholarship,
BSJ's goal appears to be striking a balance between these potentially oppos
50
ing goals. As McCrudden frames the inquiry: "[I]s there a way of
harnessing . . . the presence of the state in the market for social purposes
without causing . . . detriment to the market as the primary means of gener
ating wealth in society? Can the two be brought into alignment to achieve
optimum economic, political, and social results?" (p. 1 14). Of course, ar
ticulating the issue in this way presupposes a strong distinction between
51
"trade" and "social" values. Under this approach, social values such as
labor rights, human rights, and environmental preservation are by definition
excluded or external to the trade system; their inclusion requires some form
52
of justification or exception.
For current purposes, I am less interested in this distinction's descriptive
53
accuracy or its problematic doctrinal and political consequences than in the
fact that key parts of BSJ are aimed at subverting this particular conceptualiza
tion of linkage issues. Consider, for example, McCrudden's extended

50. Similar balancing imagery is found in much of the linkage literature. See, e.g., Frank J.
Garcia, The Salmon Case: Evolution of Balancing Mechanisms for Non-Trade Values in WTO, in
TRADE AND HUMAN HEALTH AND SAFETY 1 33 (George A. Bermann & Petros Mavroidis eds.,
2006).
5 1 . See, e.g., James Thuo Gathii, Re-Characterizing the Social in the Constimtionalization of
the WTO: A Preliminary Analysis, 7 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 1 37 (200 1 ); Andrew T.F. Lang, Reflecting
on 'Linkage ': Cognitive and Institutional Change in the lntemational Trading System, 70 Moo. L.
REV. 523, 536, 538 (2007).
52.

Lang, supra note 5 1 , at 538.

53. See Jeffrey L. Dunoff, "Trade and": Recent Developments in Trade Policy and Scholar
ship-And Their Surprising Political Implications, 1 7 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 759 ( 1 996-97).
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argument that we should broadly understand the subject matter of procure
ment contracts as including social objectives (pp. 522-3 1). "If the subject
matter of the contract can itself be the delivery of the social policy, then social
issues are no longer 'secondary' to the contract, but central to it . . . ."
(p. 524).
In other words, those parts of BSJ that frame the issue presented as how
best to balance the competing demands of economic and social values tend
to reinforce and perpetuate precisely the conceptual framework that other
54
parts of BSJ persuasively critique. McCrudden's critique suggests that it is
impossible to separate the "trade" dimension of a procurement contract from
the "social" dimensions of that contract. And even if this insight leads
McCrudden to suggest a legal strategy that is, as noted above, doctrinally
suspect, McCrudden's critique has the considerable conceptual virtue of
problematizing the conventional distinction between pursuit of "economic"
and "social" values. Moreover, as discussed in Section IIl.C below, the cri
tique can be used to help construct an argument for why states should have
ample discretion to pursue "social" goals through procurement.

B. BSJ 's Legal Centralism
Another problematic aspect of BSJ's analysis is its overly sanguine
treatment of international procurement law's ability to constrain state behav
ior. As a result, BSJ overemphasizes the role of legal doctrine and
underanalyzes the empirical effects of international procurement norms.
Like the literature it straddles, BSJ adopts an approach that we might la
55
bel "legal centralism." As Andrew Lang and Robert Wolfe suggest, a
critical dimension of the legal centralist approach as found in trade scholar
ship is a foundational assumption regarding "the extent to which WTO
obligations are central . . . [to] policy-making processes and the degree of
56
importance which national policy-makers place upon them in practice."
Thus, one of BSJ's central themes is "the role of law" (pp. 1 6- 1 7), and the
book purports to devote substantial attention to "the [GPA's] effects, [both]
direct and indirect" on procurement law across states (p. 30 1). However,
despite BSJ's richly textured review of procurement developments in various
countries, the text provides little detail regarding the extent to which WTO
law influences either the drafting of procurement laws or the application of
those laws in day-to-day decision making in different states.
Of course, whether WTO obligations are central or peripheral to deci
sionmaking depends, in the first instance, on whether relevant governmental
54. See Lang, supra note 5 1 , at 538 (making a similar observation about linkage scholar
ship); Dunoff, supra note 53 (same).
55. The term originates in legal pluralist thought and connotes an understanding of law as
"an exclusive, systematic and unified hierarchical ordering of normative propositions." John Grif
fiths, What is legal Pluralism?, 24 1. LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. I, 3 ( 1 986).
56. Andrew T.F. Lang, Re-thinking Trade and Human Rights, 15 TuL. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
335, 349 (2007); see also Robert Wolfe, See You in Geneva ? Legal (Mis)Representarions of rhe
Trading Sysrem, 1 1 EuR. J. lNT'L REL. 339 (2005).
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and private actors are knowledgeable about these rules. BSJ provides little
evidence to suggest either that relevant parties systematically consider the
relevance of WTO norms or that states systematically undertake GPA com
pliance review. However, substantial indirect and anecdotal evidence
suggests that many of the relevant actors do not systematically rely upon or
refer to GPA norms. For example:
In at least some respects, GPA parties systematically ignore GPA provi
sions. For example, GPA parties are obliged to collect and provide to
the WTO on an annual basis various procurement statistics. According
to the WTO website, as of July 2008, not a single GPA party had sub
mitted statistics for 2007, only one party submitted statistics for 2006,
and only two parties submitted statistics for 2005 and 2004. 57
In critical i nstances, lawmakers are ignorant of the GPA's existence and
requirements. For example, the key sponsor of the Massachusetts
Burma law, Representative Byron Rushing, was apparently not even
aware of WTO rules on procurement when he wrote the bill: "I had no
idea we were party to the Government Procurement blah-blah."58
There is little evidence that states systematically monitor procurement
practices in other states or raise issues concerning GPA compliance. For
example, although WTO dispute settlement is the most active interna
tional dispute system in history-with over 370 complaints notified to
the WTO through June 2008, resulting in over J OO adopted panel and
Appellate Body reports-it appears that only four disputes i nvolved
59
procurement issues.
The private actors most directly affected by the GPA do not use avail
able mechanisms to ensure GPA compliance. The GPA requires that
private parties aggrieved by alleged violations of the treaty have access
to domestic fora. However, to date, it does not appear that a single case
alleging a GPA violation has been filed before U.S. courts or adminis
trative agencies.
While hardly conclusive, these observations suggest skepticism about one of
BSJ's fundamental empirical premises-that the GPA importantly affects
state officials and private parties. Strikingly, in a book that details multiple
domestic procurement regimes, little attention is devoted to examining the
influence of GPA norms within international political and legal cultures,
national regulatory structures, or domestic trading and legal communities
and what little evidence is presented suggests that the GPA has had "rela
tively little effect" (p. 222).60
57. Figures obtained from WTO website. See Statistics Reports under Article XIX:5 of the
GPA, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/gpstat_e.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2008).
58. Edward T. Swaine, Negotiating Federalism: State Bargaining and the Dormant Treaty
49 DUKE L.J. 1 1 27, 1 1 34 n.23 (2000) (quoting Representative Rushing).

Power,

59. See, e.g., WTO Secretariat, Update of WTO Dispute Settlement Cases, WT/DS/OV/33
(June 3, 2008).
60. Other studies suggest that international efforts to refonn domestic procurement systems
have met with limited success. See, e.g., OECD/DAC WORLD BANK ROUND TABLE, INTERNATIONAL
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Moreover, even if policy makers consider GPA norms controlling, these
norms are highly indeterminate and are qualified by a complex series of ex
ceptions and exemptions. As Part II above suggests, the GPA and a plethora
of other international norms may be sufficiently vague and ambiguous that a
state can pursue virtually any procurement policy it wishes and plausibly
claim that it is complying with the rules. In these circumstances, we should
not simply assume that GPA obligations are central to state decisions.
To be sure, BSJ would not be the first text to overstate international
law 's role in influencing state behavior. And identifying the gap between the
law and practice does not render legal analysis inconsequential. But it does
suggest the desirability of reframing traditional debates over international
procurement rules, many of which are premised on an empirically problem
atic view of international law's role in this area.
C. Toward a Theory of Procurement
Paradoxically, juxtaposing these two aspects of BSJ's argumentative
structure suggests the outline of a justification for why international law
should grant states wide latitude to pursue social objectives through pro
curement, including being able to use procurement to advance social
objectives in other states.
As parts of BSJ persuasively argue, it is not conceptually possible to
completely separate procurement's economic and social effects. Govern
ment purchases necessarily implicate social concerns: state hiring in
connection with the building of, say, large public works projects, can either
ameliorate or exacerbate existing racial or regional patterns of underem
ployment. In a globalized age marked by highly integrated international
markets and state purchases totaling trillions of dollars per year, government
procurement inevitably affects social conditions abroad. It is becoming in
creasingly clear that the importation of certain goods may help subsidize
and entrench abusive human rights practices in foreign lands, and the pur
chase of other products may contribute to unsustainable production practices
abroad.
Governments surely have legitimate interests in addressing these social
effects, either because problematic social conditions abroad generate spill
over effects that impact domestic interests, or because states have an interest
in not financially supporting activities that they find morally objectionable.
Under this latter principle, the Massachusetts law could be understood to
represent "repulsion by the people of Massachusetts, as represented by the
legislature, at the prospect of collaborating even indirectly with the notably

B ENCHMARKS AND STANDARDS FOR PUBLIC PROCUREMENT SYSTEMS, para 3 (2003), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/35n/2488588.pdf ("(D]evelopment of public procurement systems
worldwide, that can deliver on the basic principles of a well functioning system, contribute to better
governance and reduce the opportunity for corruption, has been slow"); see also Robert R. Hunja,
Obstacles to Public Procurement Refonn in Developing Countries, in PUBLIC PROCUREMENT: THE
CONTINUING REVOLUTION 13 (Sue Arrowsmith & Martin Trybus eds., 2003).
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61
tyrannical regime that currently controls Burma." Moreover, to the extent
Type Ill laws are genuinely motivated by and aimed at social conditions
abroad, they do not reflect the local protectionism that violates the GPA's
national treatment obligation.
One objection to this line of argument is that procurement is an ineffi
cient mechanism for promoting social justice; most economic analysis
suggests that "[d]irect legislation . . . and not the use of indirect financial
incentives or sanctions that have unacceptable or unpredictable distorting
effects, are seen as the best way of enforcing required norms without unac
ceptable side-effects" (p. 1 19). Moreover, procurement might also be seen as
an ineffective policy tool as procurement laws may be largely ineffective
outside of those areas of economic activity that are particularly dependent
upon government contracts (p. 1 1 9).
Note, however, that these objections implicitly assume the relative supe
riority of prescriptive regulation over procurement as a tool for constraining
or changing behavior. But this assumption may overstate the effectiveness of
traditional regulation, which typically is less than entirely successful in
achieving its goals and often produces unwanted and unintended conse
quences. We've seen above some of the ways that many states fail to comply
with "regulatory" treaties such as the GPA . In addition, highly visible do
mestic experience suggests that regulations and litigation aimed at
promoting the types of social goals advanced through procurement laws
often enjoy only limited success, and that the government's power of the
62
purse is at times the most effective way of advancing certain social goals.
From a scholarly perspective, McCrudden's analysis points toward a fu
ture research agenda involving a detailed consideration of the relative
efficacy of procurement and regulation. Without investigating the relative
success of procurement and regulation as alternative mechanisms, it is im
possible to sensibly answer the larger questions that BSJ raises about the
appropriate use of procurement policy to advance social ends. To be sure,
such a comparative inquiry is difficult and, at best, likely to yield recom
mendations that are contingent and qualified. Yet without engaging in this
form of comparative analysis, it is difficult to generate meaningful empiri
cal, doctrinal, or normative claims about the appropriate scope and details of
procurement law. Moreover, whatever level of success regulation has in
promoting social objectives domestically, such laws will invariably have less
success at modifying conditions abroad. Hence, the inadequacy of other
forms of regulatory tools-the limits of the law--offers an additional justi
fication for using procurement to advance social ends.

6 1 . Sanford Levinson, Compelling Collaboration with Evil? A Comment on Crosby v.
National Foreign Trade Council, 69 FoRDHAM L. REV. 2 1 89, 2 1 9 1 (2001 ) (analogizing the Supreme
Court's decision striking down the Massachusetts law to Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 4 1 U.S. ( 1 6 Pet.)
539 ( 1 842)).
62. GARY 0RFIELD, THE GROWTH OF SEGREGATION IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS: CHANGING
PATTERNS OF SEPARATION AND POVERTY SINCE 1 968 ( 1 993) (detailing Southern resistance to
school desegregation orders and how conditionality of federal funding helped to advance racial
integration).
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CONCLUSION
BSJ's singular achievement is to highlight how the state's power of the
purse is-and should be-used to promote social values. The book provides
an impressive review of procurement developments in multiple jurisdictions,
and Christopher McCrudden deserves praise for the breadth of his research,
the care with which he develops his arguments, and the analytical rigor of
his claims.
Today, international procurement law is not high on the diplomatic
agenda. But this could quickly change. A legal challenge to a South African
law designed to promote black economic empowerment is currently pend
63
ing. Should this dispute, or another, produce a ruling where international
norms threaten procurement laws designed to promote social objectives,
procurement will move quickly to the center of the international legal and
political stage. If and when this occurs, Buying Social Justice will provide a
thoughtful and thorough guide to the issues that will need to be addressed.

63. Piero Foresti v. Republic of South Africa, No. ARB/(Af)/07/1 (ICSID (W. Bank) regis
tered Jan. 8, 2007). Status updates on the case are available on the ICSID website. International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, List of Pending Cases, http://icsid.worldbank.org/
ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=GenCaseDtlsRH&actionVal=ListPending (last visited Jan. 5,
2009).

